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SETTLEMENT IN THE ABSENCE OF 
ANTICIPATED ADJUDICATION 
Howard M. Erichson* 
INTRODUCTION 
As an ethical matter, the litigator’s role is defined largely by reference to 
the push and pull of zealous advocacy.  The lawyer owes an affirmative 
duty to advocate for the client’s objectives, and the lawyer faces constraints 
premised largely on concerns that lawyers may overzealously pursue those 
objectives.  The lawyer’s role as settlement negotiator meshes with and 
flows from the lawyer’s role as the client’s advocate:  by advancing the 
client’s position in litigation, the lawyer-as-advocate strengthens the client’s 
bargaining leverage, and in discussing settlement on the client’s behalf, the 
lawyer-as-negotiator pursues the client’s objectives. 
But this view of the lawyer’s role in settlement as naturally 
complementary to the lawyer’s role in litigation assumes that the client has 
a path to adjudication.  What if the path to adjudication is obstructed?  In 
the era of the “vanishing trial,”1 does the lawyer’s role as negotiator remain 
a complementary outgrowth of the lawyer’s role as advocate?  The 
phenomenon of vanishing trials takes too many forms to be coherently 
understood as a singularity, but in several of its forms, it involves 
developments that place adjudication out of reach either as a legal matter or 
as a practical matter.  The unavailability of adjudication not only shifts the 
 
*  Professor of Law, Fordham University School of Law. My thanks to the Fordham Law 
Review, the Stein Center for Law and Ethics, and all of the participants in the colloquium 
entitled Civil Litigation Ethics at a Time of Vanishing Trials held at Fordham University 
School of Law.  For an overview of the colloquium, see Judith Resnik, Lawyers’ Ethics 
Beyond the Vanishing Trial:  Unrepresented Claimants, De Facto Aggregations, Arbitration 
Mandates, and Privatized Processes, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1899 (2017). 
 
 1. See, e.g., SUJA A. THOMAS, THE MISSING AMERICAN JURY:  RESTORING THE 
FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONAL ROLE OF THE CIVIL, CRIMINAL, AND GRAND JURIES (2016); 
Stephen B. Burbank & Stephen N. Subrin, Litigation and Democracy:  Restoring a Realistic 
Prospect of Trial, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 399 (2011); Marc Galanter, The Vanishing 
Trial:  An Examination of Trials and Related Matters in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459 (2004); Patricia Lee Refo, Opening Statement:  The Vanishing 
Trial, LITIG. ONLINE, Winter 2004, at 2, http://www.americanbar.org/content/ 
dam/aba/publishing/litigation_journal/04winter_openingstatement.authcheckdam.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/RV9H-GTS3]; Benjamin Weiser, Trial by Jury, a Hallowed American 
Right, Is Vanishing, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2016/08/08/nyregion/jury-trials-vanish-and-justice-is-served-behind-closed-doors.html 
[https://perma.cc/X7VA-WZ2F]. 
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parties’ bargaining positions vis-à-vis each other, it also shifts the lawyer’s 
position vis-à-vis the client in the negotiation of a settlement. 
Conditions of unlikely adjudication take several forms.  First, the cost of 
litigation or a litigant’s resource disadvantage may leave the litigant unable 
to sustain the claim or defense through adjudication.2  Second, judicial 
pressure, including court-annexed alternative dispute resolution (ADR), 
may push parties away from adjudication.3  Third, crowded dockets may 
slow the road to trial,4 and in mass civil litigation in particular, there may be 
little prospect of adjudication in the foreseeable future for all but a handful 
of plaintiffs.5  Fourth, in settlement class actions, lawyers pursue 
settlements on behalf of classes that have not been certified for litigation 
and thus, as constituted, have no power to pursue claims to adjudication.6 
In each of these circumstances, the faded prospect of adjudication does 
not merely reduce one party’s bargaining power; it alters the lawyer’s 
incentives in pursuing a negotiated resolution.  This Article explores the 
relevance of the unavailability of adjudication to the lawyer’s role in 
settlement, with particular attention to lawyer-client conflicts of interest 
created or exacerbated by the unavailability of adjudication. 
I leave aside, for purposes of this discussion, other manifestations of the 
vanishing trials phenomenon.  For example, arbitration clauses remove 
disputes from the judicial system and thus eliminate the prospect of 
adjudication, at least insofar as adjudication is defined as the rendering of a 
binding judgment by a public court.  Private arbitration differs from public 
adjudication, and courts have gone too far in the enforcement of arbitration 
clauses in contracts of adhesion, even when those clauses contain class 
action prohibitions and other problematic constraints.7  But at least for 
purposes of this discussion of lawyer-client conflicts in the absence of 
anticipated adjudication, the prospect of an arbitral award resembles the 
prospect of adjudication nearly enough to be treated differently from 
situations in which adjudication is out of reach. 
Similarly, this Article does not address the aspect of the vanishing trials 
phenomenon that distinguishes pretrial adjudication from trial adjudication, 
or the related distinction between the power of the judge and the jury.8  
Although there are important differences between judge and jury as well as 
between pretrial and trial adjudication, this Article focuses on a more basic 
 
 2. See AM. COLL. OF TRIAL LAWYERS, THE “VANISHING TRIAL”:  THE COLLEGE, THE 
PROFESSION, THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM 15–18 (2004); Burbank & Subrin, supra note 1, at 
409–12 (proposing a streamlined discovery regime for simple cases as a way to preserve the 
availability of trial in cases that litigants otherwise might abandon as too costly); Galanter, 
supra note 1, at 517 (noting costliness of litigation as one explanation of vanishing trials). 
 3. See Galanter, supra note 1, at 514–15, 517. 
 4. See Refo, supra note 1, at 3. 
 5. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. 
L. REV. 399 (2014). 
 6. See Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 951, 957–58 (2014). 
 7. See generally Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes:  The Public in the Private of 
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804 (2015). 
 8. See THOMAS, supra note 1, at 235–37; Burbank & Subrin, supra note 1, at 401–03. 
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aspect of the vanishing trials phenomenon—the difference between cases in 
which adjudication of any sort is realistically available and cases in which it 
is not. 
This Article begins with an account of the lawyer’s role in settlement in 
what we might call the traditional litigation scenario—that is, litigation in 
which settlement negotiations are conducted in the shadow of anticipated 
adjudication.  This Article then considers four scenarios in which the 
anticipation of adjudication is altered—resource inadequacy, judicial 
settlement pressure, lengthy calendar, and class actions not certified for 
litigation—and asks what effect we should expect each scenario to have on 
the interests of lawyers and clients regarding settlement.  The final part asks 
what light this analysis sheds on the phenomenon of vanishing trials and 
concludes with a comment on the importance of anticipated adjudication to 
achieving justice in litigation settlements. 
The conclusion can be summed up simply:  fair settlement of disputes 
requires a path to adjudication.  A viable path to adjudication obviously 
does not assure a fair settlement; it is a necessary condition, not a sufficient 
one.  The problem is not the lack of trials per se but rather that a disputant 
cannot obtain a fair negotiated resolution if she lacks the ability to opt for 
an adjudicated resolution.  This problem results not only from the 
bargaining disadvantage of any party seeking to change the status quo who 
lacks a path toward legal compulsion of that result but also from the less 
obvious problem that hard-to-get adjudication exacerbates lawyer-client 
conflicts in the negotiation of settlements. 
I.  LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND SETTLEMENT 
IN THE SHADOW OF ANTICIPATED ADJUDICATION 
We begin with a standard account of the lawyer-client relationship in 
litigation and settlement.  A lawyer representing a plaintiff files a complaint 
on that client’s behalf.  A lawyer representing a defendant responds to the 
complaint by answer or motion.  The litigation process moves forward, with 
each lawyer working to advance the client’s objectives in litigation—in 
general presumably the maximization of remedies on behalf of the plaintiff 
and the minimization of liability on behalf of the defendant.  At any point 
along the way, the disputants may attempt to reach a negotiated resolution.  
This may occur on the eve of trial or appeal or at the opposite end of the 
timeline—before the defendant has responded to the complaint or even 
before the complaint is filed—or anywhere in between.  In the attempt to 
reach a settlement, the lawyers often negotiate on behalf of their clients.9 
As an ethical matter, the litigator’s duty is defined largely in terms of 
what many still refer to as “zealous advocacy.”10  Although rules of 
 
 9. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, ETHICAL GUIDELINES FOR SETTLEMENT NEGOTIATIONS 
§ 2.1 (2002) (“During settlement negotiations and in concluding a settlement, a lawyer is the 
client’s representative and fiduciary, and should act in the client’s best interest and in 
furtherance of the client’s lawful goals.”). 
 10. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT pmbl. (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016) (“As 
advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client’s position under the rules of the adversary 
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professional conduct have largely dropped the language of zeal, focusing 
instead on the lawyer’s duties of diligence and loyalty,11 the concept 
remains that the lawyer owes a duty to the client to pursue the client’s 
objectives in litigation.  Ethics rules define the lawyer’s affirmative duty in 
terms of diligently pursuing the client’s goals,12 and they define the 
lawyer’s constraints in advocacy largely in terms of competing duties (such 
as duties of candor toward the tribunal,13 prohibitions on baseless claims 
and defenses,14 and duties of honesty to adversaries and third parties15) that 
are meant to pull lawyers back from their inclination toward overzealous 
advocacy on the client’s behalf.16 
The lawyer often serves as negotiator, but ultimately the settlement 
decision belongs to the client.  Few things are as unequivocal in the Model 
Rules of Professional Conduct (“the Rules”) as the client’s authority over 
settlement:  “A lawyer shall abide by a client’s decision whether to settle a 
matter.”17  This makes sense both in terms of Rule 1.2(a)’s distinction 
between ends and means18 and in terms of who owns the claim and who 
faces liability.19  The claim belongs to the plaintiff, not to the plaintiff’s 
lawyer.  Liability is imposed on the defendant and often its insurer, not on 
 
system.”); see also id. (“[W]hen an opposing party is well represented, a lawyer can be a 
zealous advocate on behalf of a client and at the same time assume that justice is being 
done.”). 
 11. See Paul C. Saunders, Whatever Happened to ‘Zealous Advocacy’?, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 
11, 2011, at 4.  Compare CANONS OF PROF’L ETHICS Canon 15 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1908) (“The 
lawyer owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and 
defense of his rights”), N.Y. LAWYER’S CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (2007) (“A 
Lawyer Should Represent a Client Zealously Within the Bounds of the Law”), and id. EC 
7-1 (“The duty of a lawyer, both to his client and to the legal system, is to represent his client 
zealously within the bounds of the law”), with MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3 (“A 
lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.”), and id. 
r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (“A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the 
client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.  A lawyer is not bound, however, 
to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client.”). 
 12. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.3; id. r. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
 13. See id. r. 3.3. 
 14. See id. rr. 3.1, 8.4(d); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
 15. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 3.4, 8.4(c). 
 16. See Susan Michmerhuizen & Peter Geraghty, Ethics Tip:  What’s the Big Zeal?, 
A.B.A. (May 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/ 
services/ethicssearch/ethicstipmay2016.html [https://perma.cc/4CVK-JZ2H]. 
 17. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a); see also Peter Geraghty &  
Susan J. Michmerhuizen, Settlement Offers:  The Client Is Always Right, A.B.A.:  
YOURABA (March 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/youraba/2016/march-
2016/settlement-offers--the-client-is-always-right.html (“This principle of client control is 
near absolute; no matter the degree to which the lawyer disagrees with the client or thinks 
the settlement is too low or predicated on poor information, he is ultimately bound to abide 
by the client’s wishes.”) [https://perma.cc/H7T5-49LZ]. 
 18. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.2(a) (“Subject to paragraphs (c) and (d), 
a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the objectives of representation and, 
as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the means by which they are to be 
pursued.”). 
 19. See Howard M. Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 
CORNELL L. REV. 265, 313 (2011) (“To lose the right to decide whether to settle one’s claim, 
and on what terms, is to lose control of that claim in a very real sense.”). 
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the defendant’s lawyer.  The decision to release the claim in exchange for 
something of value therefore belongs to the plaintiff, and the decision to 
pay something in exchange for release of the claim belongs to the 
defendant.  As the ABA Ethical Guidelines for Settlement Negotiations put 
it, “While a lawyer can and often should vigorously advise the client of the 
lawyer’s views respecting proposed settlement strategies and terms, that 
advice should not override or intrude into the client’s ultimate decision-
making authority.”20 
In this traditional scenario, the lawyer’s work as negotiator differs from 
the lawyer’s work as litigator but not for the most part in ways that alter the 
lawyer’s basic ethical position.  Vis-à-vis the adversary, the lawyer-as-
negotiator may well take on a more cooperative and less adversarial role, 
but vis-à-vis the client, the lawyer’s duty remains one of diligence and 
loyalty in pursuit of the client’s objectives and deference to the client’s 
authority over settlement. 
Depending on the fee structure, different lawyer-client conflicts of 
interest in here in the lawyer’s role as settlement negotiator.  Hourly fees, 
contingent fees, flat fees, and court-awarded fees each have the potential to 
give lawyer-negotiators economic interests that deviate from their clients’ 
interests and preferences.21  The differences in these incentives may be 
summarized briefly as follows. 
In general, hourly fees give lawyers an economic incentive to disfavor 
settlement as compared with their clients and for similar reasons give 
lawyers an interest in settling later rather than earlier.22  A risk-averse 
client—as plaintiff or as defendant—may prefer to avoid trial, but the 
hourly fee lawyer does not share equally in the risk.  Thus, as between 
lawyer and client, an hourly fee arrangement should be expected to make 
 
 20. AM. BAR ASS’N, supra note 9, § 3.2.4 committee notes.  The Notes go on to say:   
Lawyers should be particularly sensitive to the risk that the client’s practical 
dependency on the lawyer may give the lawyer immense power to influence or 
overcome the client’s will respecting a proposed settlement. . . .  Efforts to 
persuade should be pursued with attention to ensuring that ultimate 
decisionmaking power remains with the client. 
Id. 
 21. Interestingly, the Rule of Professional Conduct that governs lawyer-client conflicts 
in transactions between lawyers and clients does not generally apply to fee agreements. See 
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.8(a) cmt. 1 (“It does not apply to ordinary fee 
arrangements between client and lawyer, which are governed by Rule 1.5, although its 
requirements must be met when the lawyer accepts an interest in the client’s business or 
other nonmonetary property as payment of all or part of a fee.”). 
 22. See Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 
189, 202–03 (1987); see also Peter Melamed, Note, An Alternative to the Contingent Fee?:  
An Assessment of the Incentive Effects of the English Conditional Fee Arrangement, 27 
CARDOZO L. REV. 2433, 2452–53 (2006) (analyzing settlement incentives generated by 
hourly fee arrangements, and concluding that lawyers without other paying work would 
indefinitely delay settlement, whereas lawyers with a steady stream of paying work would be 
indifferent as between settlement and trial). 
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the lawyer less inclined toward settlement and particularly less inclined 
toward settling early.23 
Contingent fees, by contrast, give lawyers an interest in settling earlier 
rather than later.24  Contingent fees should be expected to increase lawyers’ 
aversion to trial because the lawyer shares fully in the client’s risk of 
getting paid nothing if the trial results in a negative verdict.  Indeed, if a 
lawyer has expended significant resources in pursuing litigation for a client, 
the lawyer may be more risk averse than the client when it comes to a 
decision whether to accept a settlement or go to trial.  Thus, as between 
lawyer and client, a contingent fee arrangement should be expected to make 
the lawyer more inclined toward settlement and more inclined to settle 
early.25 
In terms of their impact on lawyer interests as opposed to client interests, 
flat fees resemble contingent fees in that they give lawyers an interest in 
settling earlier rather than later, but the conflict is even greater because the 
lawyer does not share in the additional recovery that may be generated by 
additional work.26  Unlike contingent fees, however, flat fees do not give 
the lawyer a fee incentive to avoid trial due to risk aversion. 
Court-awarded fees share a combination of these attributes.  To the extent 
lawyers expect a judge to award fees based on a lodestar method—
multiplying the number of hours by a reasonable hourly rate27—court-
awarded fees generate similar incentives to hourly fees, at least in terms of 
the timing of settlement.28  To the extent lawyers expect a court to award 
 
 23. Thus, it is incorrect to suppose that the only fee structures that entail conflicts of 
interest are non-time-based fees. See, e.g., Mark A. Neubauer, Attorney Fees:  How to Avoid 
a Conflict with Your Client, A.B.A.:  GP SOLO (March 2011), http://www.americanbar.org/ 
publications/gp_solo/2011/march/attorney_fees_how_t0_avoid_a_conflict_with_your_ 
client.html (“Any departure from an hourly rate creates a potential conflict between lawyer 
and client.”) [https://perma.cc/CKS4-K34W]. 
 24. See Miller, supra note 22, at 198–202; Melamed, supra note 22, at 2447–51. 
 25. Peter Melamed illustrates the point with graphs and explains “why the contingent fee 
attorney who maintains control over his client’s case will rationally choose to settle for an 
amount that is lower than what his client might choose to settle for.  For each successive 
hour that the attorney works, he receives a marginally smaller return.” Melamed, supra note 
22, at 2451.  Turning to the client’s point of view, he notes, “His client, meanwhile, would 
prefer that the attorney work as long as possible on the case, since the client has no incentive 
to limit his attorney’s hours.  Therefore, the attorney has an incentive to settle much earlier 
than his client would have him settle.” Id. 
 26. See Neubauer, supra note 23 (“A lawyer on a fixed fee has an economic incentive 
not to take that extra deposition—the lawyer gets the savings.  The contingency fee 
accommodates that conflict because the lawyer and client are aligned and both are paid if 
success is achieved. . . .  No one has yet come up with a solution for this conflict, but it 
merits a full discussion with the client and carefully spelled-out terms in an initial fee 
agreement and as the litigation progresses.”). 
 27. See Perdue v. Kenny A., 559 U.S. 542, 551–52 (2010) (embracing the lodestar 
approach as the dominant method for determining fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2012)); 
Laffitte v. Robert Half Int’l, Inc., 376 P.3d 672, 677–82 (Cal. 2016) (discussing the history 
of both the lodestar and percentage approaches for awarding class action fees). 
 28. See Laffitte, 376 P.3d at 677 (noting that the lodestar method has been “criticized for 
discouraging early settlement”). 
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fees based on a percent-of-outcome method,29 court-awarded fees generate 
similar incentives to contingent fees.30  As to risk aversion, court-awarded 
fees—because they depend upon prevailing party status or the creation of a 
common fund—resemble contingent fees in giving lawyers an economic 
incentive to prefer settlement. 
Because every variety of fee arrangement has the potential to give 
lawyers different incentives from clients when it comes to settlement, it 
would be wrong to think that a path to adjudication could ever guarantee 
perfect alignment of lawyer and client interests in settlement.  But the path 
to adjudication matters.  It is not simply that the path to adjudication sets 
the basis for achieving fair value in settlement.  It is also that the path to 
adjudication reduces the problems of lawyer-client conflicts of interest in 
settlement negotiation.  As long as litigation is marching expeditiously 
toward adjudication, most of the conflicts described above are kept in 
check.  In terms of settlement timing, the longer the path to adjudication, 
the greater the conflict between those who benefit from a shorter path and 
those who benefit from a longer path.  In terms of risk aversion, the more 
unrealistic the prospect of adjudication, the greater the conflict between 
those who have expended significant resources and those who have not. 
II.  LAWYERS, CLIENTS, AND SETTLEMENT 
WHEN ADJUDICATION IS HARD TO GET 
Situations that pull litigants and litigators out of adjudication’s shadow—
even if the situations increase the likelihood of settlement—tend to reduce 
the likelihood of achieving settlements that reflect the merits of claims and 
defenses. 
Before turning to the problems such situations create by exacerbating 
attorney-client conflicts of interest, it is worth acknowledging the more 
basic problem that removing the shadow of adjudication disadvantages the 
party seeking to alter the status quo, generally the plaintiff.  The threat of 
legal compulsion to force a defendant to pay damages or alter its conduct—
that is, the threat of adjudication—is the only thing that gives plaintiffs 
meaningful leverage in settlement.  In the absence of realistic anticipated 
adjudication, a defendant may nonetheless happily pay some amount to 
avoid the nuisance and expense of protracted litigation or may pay some 
amount to gain widespread protection against liability in the case of 
widespread harms.  But without anticipated adjudication, there is no reason 
to expect that the amount would reflect the value of the claims on the 
 
 29. See id. at 679 (noting that “[c]urrently, all the [federal] circuit courts either mandate 
or allow their district courts to use the percentage method in common fund cases; none 
require sole use of the lodestar method”); see also id. at 686 (permitting the percentage 
method for awarding class counsel common fund fees under California law); Theodore 
Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, Attorney Fees in Class Action Settlements:  An Empirical 
Study, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 27 (2004). 
 30. See Laffitte, 376 P.3d at 677 (“[A] percentage award may also provide incentives to 
attorneys to settle for too low a recovery because an early settlement provides them with a 
larger fee in terms of the time invested.” (quoting Rawlings v. Prudential-Bache Props., Inc., 
9 F.3d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1993))). 
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merits.31  As Stephen Burbank and Stephen Subrin put it, “Although most 
cases settle, some trials are essential, if only to ensure informed 
settlement.”32  “Without the realistic possibility of a trial,” they write, 
“some plaintiffs receive less than the value of their cases if tried on the 
merits, while some defendants settle non-meritorious cases in order to avoid 
transaction costs.”33 
This aspect of the problem applies directly to litigants.  In other words, it 
does not depend upon the existence of a lawyer-client relationship.  Even in 
the case of a pro se plaintiff against a pro se defendant, obstacles to 
adjudication alter the settlement dynamic in favor of the defendant.34  When 
litigation and negotiation involve lawyers, however, the problem of 
stepping out of the shadow of adjudication has another layer.  We now turn 
to the effect of obstacles to adjudication on lawyer-client conflicts of 
interest in settlement negotiation. 
A.  Resource Inadequacy 
Perhaps the most common scenario in which adjudication remains out of 
reach is when a disputant, despite having a sound position on the merits, 
lacks the resources to pursue a claim or defense to adjudication.35  That is, 
the person lacks the funds to hire a lawyer on an hourly fee, the stakes are 
too low to entice a lawyer to represent the party on a contingent fee, and the 
matter is too difficult or costly to pursue pro se.  If the person is a potential 
plaintiff who neither files a complaint nor hires a lawyer, then very likely 
there will be no settlement.  And if the person is a defendant who lacks the 
resources to respond to the complaint, then the likely result is default.  But 
suppose a party has hired a lawyer and started down the litigation path but 
cannot invest the resources necessary to pursue the claim or defense to trial.  
 
 31. See generally Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Private Ordering Through Negotiation:  
Dispute-Settlement and Rulemaking, 89 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1976) (comparing dispute-
negotiation and adjudication and finding important similarities in terms of the invocation of 
norms); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law:  
The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 968 (1979) (observing that anticipated trial 
outcomes give each party bargaining chips in negotiation. 
 32. Burbank & Subrin, supra note 1, at 401. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Cf. Russell Engler, And Justice for All—Including the Unrepresented Poor:  
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1987, 2029 
(1999) (discussing the importance of the judge’s role in helping pro se litigants develop a 
factual record and identifying claims and defenses before settling, and noting that “[o]nly by 
first assessing the merits of the case can the judge gain perspective as to what, if any, claims 
are being compromised or waived”). 
 35. See Jed S. Rakoff, Why You Won’t Get Your Day in Court, N.Y. REV. BOOKS (Nov. 
24, 2016), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/2016/11/24/why-you-wont-get-your-day-in-
court/ (noting that “most observers agree that the primary reason so many Americans are 
unrepresented in court is that even people of moderate means simply cannot afford a 
lawyer”; that “the fact that civil cases are being settled at an ever greater rate suggests that 
something else is bringing pressure to settle, and it is probably the great expense of 
litigation”; and that “the time-consuming nature of modern litigation means that most 
contingent-fee lawyers will simply refuse to take on a case that does not promise an award or 
settlement of at least several hundred thousand dollars, leaving those tort victims who cannot 
sue for large amounts unable to have a day in court”) [https://perma.cc/22T2-TMRG]. 
2017] SETTLEMENT WITHOUT ANTICIPATED ADJUDICATION 2025 
It is this situation—the one in which a settlement negotiation may occur and 
one side lacks the ability to pursue the litigation to adjudication—on which 
we will focus. 
One version is when the cost of the litigation, as things proceed, turns out 
to be higher than expected.  A second is when the value of the claim, as 
things proceed, turns out to be lower than expected.  A third is when a small 
claim would be litigable collectively with many similar claims, but a court 
enforces an arbitration clause with a prohibition on class actions and other 
collective litigation, making the individual claim unrealistic to litigate or 
arbitrate to a final decision.  For all of them, the high cost of litigation poses 
a significant obstacle.36 
A party’s lack of resources alters the negotiating dynamic to that party’s 
disadvantage.  Perhaps less obviously, lack of resources also exacerbates 
lawyer-client conflicts of interest that inhere in settlement negotiations.  If 
the lawyer is working on a contingent fee arrangement or in expectation of 
court-awarded fees that depend upon the outcome, the lawyer’s interest in 
early and certain settlement becomes even greater as the anticipated return 
on investment declines.  Even if the lawyer is working on an hourly or flat 
fee basis, resource constraints may leave a lawyer concerned about the 
collectability of a fee as a practical matter in the absence of a settlement.  
Thus, when a party cannot afford to pursue a claim to adjudication, the 
party’s lawyer has an interest in pushing the client to accept a settlement 
even if it fails to reflect the value of the claim on the merits. 
B.  Judicial Pressure 
A second type of obstacle in the path to adjudication is judicial 
settlement pressure.  Properly deployed, judicial encouragement of 
settlement may provide a useful catalyst for parties to enter negotiations and 
may be seen as facilitative of a just resolution rather than an obstacle to it.37  
Court-annexed dispute resolution mechanisms such as mandatory 
mediation, mandatory nonbinding arbitration, early neutral evaluation, and 
summary jury trials may facilitate negotiation in a way that is advantageous 
to both parties.  Even without formal ADR mechanisms, a judicial nudge 
may be exactly what the parties need to get started on productive 
negotiations.38  But clumsily deployed judicial settlement encouragement 
may place obstacles in the path to adjudication without sufficient upside to 
justify the imposition.39  If one or both parties is intent on getting a binding 
 
 36. See Burbank & Subrin, supra note 1, at 409–10 (“The high cost of litigation 
dissuades some potential litigants with meritorious claims from commencing suit and forces 
some of those who do sue, and some defendants, into settlements that do not truly reflect the 
merits.”). 
 37. See Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”:  Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1345 (1994). 
 38. Cf. FED. R. CIV. P. 16. 
 39. See Campbell Killefer, Wrestling with the Judge Who Wants You to Settle, 35 
LITIGATION 17 (2009); Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 375, 388–91 (2014) (discussing judges’ roles in settlement, including 
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adjudication from the court, or if one party faces a significant resource 
disadvantage, time-consuming detours or judicial pressure may do more 
harm than good and may exacerbate lawyer-client conflicts with regard to 
settlement. 
To the extent judicially imposed ADR functions as an obstacle to 
adjudication, it may tax the parties’ resources or delay recovery.40  If so, it 
may give rise to a situation in which a lawyer worries that the only way to 
get paid is by obtaining a recovery, and the longer the process wears on, the 
less likely the lawyer will be able to recoup the costs of litigation.41 
Further, when settlement pressure comes from a judge, a lawyer’s 
reputation and relationship with the judge may become part of the cost-
benefit analysis in the negotiation from the lawyer’s perspective.  Whereas 
any particular client is unlikely to be a repeat player before a particular 
judge, the same is not true for a lawyer who practices in the jurisdiction.  
Thus, even if a client is uninterested in the settlement offer on the table or 
uninterested in settlement at all and determined to obtain an adjudication 
from the court, the client’s lawyer may nonetheless feel compelled to 
participate in the negotiation process out of concern for the lawyer’s 
relationships and reputation.  This is not to say that concern for 
relationships and reputation ought not play a role in attorney conduct.  To a 
large extent, the legal profession relies on these mechanisms to insure 
civility and adherence to professional norms.  On the question of settlement 
negotiation, however, where the law unequivocally gives the client rather 
than the lawyer the authority to decide whether to settle,42 we should be 
wary of situations that create an interest on the part of the lawyer to deviate 
from the client’s preferences. 
C.  Lengthy Calendars and Mass Disputes 
Third, a lengthy calendar toward trial may function as an obstacle to 
adjudication.43  There is truth in the cliché that justice delayed is justice 
denied, at least for a litigant who cannot afford to wait.  Perhaps, because of 
the likelihood of settlement, it is more precise to say that justice delayed is 
justice diminished.  A long wait for trial may result in a party’s 
acquiescence in a settlement that the party would reject if prompt 
adjudication were possible.  As with resource disparity, delay’s basic 
skewing effect on settlement applies directly to litigants even without 
regard to tensions in the lawyer-client relationship.  But again, this obstacle 
has the effect of exacerbating lawyer-client conflicts.  Crowded dockets or 
 
advantages and disadvantages). See generally Galanter & Cahill, supra note 37 (exploring 
the difficulty of assessing the positive or negative impact of judicial settlement promotion). 
 40. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 37, at 1366 n.108 (citing findings of longer wait 
times for trial in courts with mandatory settlement conferences). 
 41. See supra notes 35–36 and accompanying text; infra notes 43–47 and accompanying 
text. 
 42. See supra notes 17–19 and accompanying text. 
 43. But see Galanter, supra note 1, at 519 (noting the argument that courts lack the 
resources to hold trials, but concluding that “it seems doubtful that lack of court resources is 
a major constraint on the number of trials”). 
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procedural slowdowns that result in a long wait for trial exacerbate the 
conflicting interests connected to the timing of settlement. 
The problem takes a particular form in mass disputes.  Federal 
multidistrict litigation44 (MDL) and consolidated state court litigation often 
lengthen the road to trial for individual litigants by making discovery and 
pretrial motion practice a gargantuan collective enterprise.  In the case of 
MDL, litigants must wait until the completion of common pretrial discovery 
before obtaining remand to the transferor court for trial.45  Moreover, 
judges overseeing MDL and state court mass litigation often schedule 
bellwether trials in individual cases.46  The purpose of bellwether trials is to 
generate data points in the form of individual jury verdicts to give both 
sides a sense of likely outcomes so that they can reach a negotiated 
resolution on a wholesale basis.47  Bellwether trials hold out the possibility 
of prompt adjudication for a few select claimants while lengthening the 
road to trial for hundreds or thousands of others.  The benefits of such trials 
are clear, but a judge should recognize the downside if the court fails to 
accompany early trials with a viable path to adjudication for those who 
were not selected as bellwethers.  Even if the judge assumes that the 
endgame of a mass dispute will be some sort of wholesale settlement 
process, the judge should understand that a wholesale settlement will offer a 
better reflection of the merits and entail less lawyer-client conflict of 
interest if the court offers a viable path to adjudication. 
A separate problem arises in the negotiation of settlements in mass 
disputes, and it relates to the unavailability of adjudication in quite a 
different way from the timing problem.  This problem relates to the identity 
of the lawyers negotiating the settlement and their lack of a lawyer-client 
relationship with some of the claimants whose interests they purport to 
represent in the negotiation.  Lawyers in leadership positions—such as 
members of a plaintiffs’ steering committee in MDL—sometimes take it 
upon themselves to negotiate with defendants for a resolution of all of the 
claims in the litigation, not only the claims of their own clients.48  The 
lawyers, and often the court, view such work as part of the responsibilities 
of their leadership positions.  When MDL leadership counsel negotiate on 
behalf of a mass of plaintiffs, many of whom they do not represent except 
indirectly through their appointment to leadership positions, the negotiating 
lawyers lack the power to bring those claims to adjudication because they 
do not represent those claimants for purposes of trial.  The risk is that such 
 
 44. See 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
 45. See Burch, supra note 5. 
 46. See Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2323, 
2324–26 (2008); Alexandra D. Lahav, Bellwether Trials, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 576 
(2008); Edward F. Sherman, The MDL Model for Resolving Complex Litigation If a Class 
Action Is Not Possible, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2205, 2213–16 (2008). 
 47. Fallon et al., supra note 46, at 2332; Sherman, supra note 46, at 2213.  For a 
variation on the theme, see Adam S. Zimmerman, The Bellwether Settlement, 85 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 2275 (2017). 
 48. See generally Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 
VAND. L. REV. 67 (2017). 
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lawyer-negotiators may negotiate settlement terms that serve their own 
interests or the interests of their own clients rather than the interests of the 
entire group on whose behalf they are purportedly negotiating.49  In this 
regard, the negotiation of comprehensive settlements by MDL leadership 
counsel resembles the negotiation of settlement class actions by putative 
class counsel and raises similar concerns.50 
D.  Class Actions Not Certified for Litigation 
When a lawyer negotiates a settlement of plaintiffs’ claims on a class 
action basis, the situation may or may not be one in which the negotiation 
takes place in the shadow of anticipated adjudication.  If the class action is 
certified for purposes of litigation and then class counsel negotiates a 
settlement with the defendant, it would fall into what this paper called the 
traditional scenario of negotiation in the shadow of anticipated 
adjudication.51  Although trial may be quite unlikely—which, after all, is 
true not only for class actions but for all litigation—the prospect of an 
adjudicated outcome drives settlement positions.  If, however, the lawyer 
negotiates a settlement on a class action basis without having the class 
action certified for purposes of litigation, then the negotiation presents an 
example of settlement outside the shadow of anticipated adjudication.52 
Settlement-only class actions present the most extreme version of the 
problem.  A clogged docket or compulsory ADR mechanisms may make 
the path to adjudication longer, but they do not bar it completely.  A 
resource disparity may make adjudication harder to obtain as a practical 
matter, but adjudication at least remains a theoretical possibility.  The 
settlement class action, by contrast, involves the negotiation of a settlement 
by a lawyer who legally has no power to pursue the class claims to 
adjudication.53 
Without the shadow of adjudication, one might ask, what exactly is the 
lawyer negotiating?  And whom exactly is the lawyer representing?  The 
lawyer presumably would respond that she represents a putative class for 
purposes of negotiating a resolution of the class claims.  The lawyer may 
even have been named interim class counsel by the court pursuant to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(g) and given the explicit direction to 
negotiate on behalf of the putative class.54  Even so, to negotiate on behalf 
 
 49. See id. 
 50. See Howard M. Erichson, Beyond the Class Action:  Lawyer Loyalty and Client 
Autonomy in Non-Class Collective Representation, 2003 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 519, 519–30. 
 51. Erichson, supra note 6, at 989 (“Armed with plenary class certification, class 
counsel could negotiate without the inherent disadvantage that accompanies the negotiation 
of a settlement class action under current law.”); Alexandra D. Lahav, Symmetry and Class 
Action Litigation, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1494, 1510 (2013) (“If plaintiffs can certify a litigated 
class, they will have leverage in settlement negotiations and in the alternative can litigate the 
case to judgment.”). 
 52. See Erichson, supra note 6, at 957–61. 
 53. See id. at 957–58; Lahav, supra note 51, at 1510–11. 
 54. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(g)(3) (“The court may designate interim counsel to act on 
behalf of a putative class before determining whether to certify the action as a class action.”); 
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of a class that cannot litigate is to negotiate with an extraordinarily weak 
BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement).55 
This is why settlement class actions present a particularly troubling case 
of lawyer-client conflicts resulting from the absence of anticipated 
adjudication.  Even if the claimants themselves might have a path to 
adjudication, either individually or collectively, the lawyer purporting to 
negotiate on their behalf lacks the authority to litigate on behalf of them as a 
class.  Thus, to the negotiating lawyer, the only sure way to keep the 
position and earn fees is to reach a deal.  The lawyer’s personal interest 
weighs in favor of striking an agreement even if the terms would not be 
appealing to the claimants themselves.56 
Now, one might ask whether the settlement class action scenario is any 
different from an individual settlement negotiation that occurs before a 
complaint has been filed.  In each case, the claim has not yet been presented 
to a court in a form that the court may adjudicate, and in each case, a lawyer 
seeks to negotiate using the leverage that comes with the implicit or explicit 
threat to litigate if the negotiation proves unsuccessful. 
The difference is twofold.  First, in the individual scenario, even if no 
complaint has yet been filed, the defendant knows that the claimant and her 
lawyer will do so if the claimant is unsatisfied with the defendant’s 
precomplaint settlement offer.  For the lawyer negotiating a precomplaint 
settlement on behalf of a specific client, rejecting a final settlement offer 
simply means moving forward with the litigation.  By contrast, in the 
settlement class action, the lawyer cannot realistically threaten to bring the 
class claims to adjudication because the lawyer does not know whether the 
class would be certified, and even if so, the lawyer does not know whether 
she would be class counsel.  For the lawyer negotiating a settlement class 
action, rejecting a final settlement offer means giving up the franchise. 
Second, in the individual scenario, even if the lawyer serves as 
negotiator, the client retains authority over the settlement decision.57  The 
client’s power to reject any settlement offer serves as a backstop.  If a 
defendant treats a precomplaint negotiation as one outside the shadow of 
anticipated adjudication and thus offers too little to fairly compensate the 
claim, the claimant can simply say no and the litigation will move forward.  
In the settlement class action, by contrast, class members lack the power to 
say no.  They have the right to opt out individually,58 but that is very 
different, both doctrinally and practically, from the power to decline the 
 
see also Erichson, supra note 6, at 960–61 (commenting on interim class counsel as a partial 
solution to the problem of settlement class actions). 
 55. The term “BATNA” was coined by Roger Fisher and William Ury. Roger Fisher & 
William Ury, GETTING TO YES:  NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT GIVING IN 99 (3d ed. 
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 56. See Howard M. Erichson, Aggregation as Disempowerment:  Red Flags in Class 
Action Settlements, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 859 (2016); Lahav, supra note 51, at 1506. 
 57. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT rr. 1.2(a), 1.8(g) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2016). 
 58. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)(B). 
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settlement as a class.  In the absence of client control over settlement, 
judicial authority to reject a proposed class settlement serves as a crucial 
protection.59  As putative class counsel negotiating a settlement class 
action, a lawyer lacks the authority to take the claims to adjudication and 
lacks the backstop of client authority over the settlement decision. 
III.  THE IMPORTANCE OF ANTICIPATED ADJUDICATION 
In a well-functioning judicial system, negotiated resolutions of litigated 
disputes should reflect not only the interests of the disputants but also a 
reasonable approximation of the factual and legal merits of claims.  Indeed, 
one of the best things about settlement is its potential to reflect the merits 
better than adjudication, given the uncertainty that accompanies factual and 
legal issues in the real world.60 
If a plaintiff has, say, a 50 percent chance of prevailing on a claim 
because of uncertainty about breach, causation, or defenses, then a 
negotiated resolution of 50 percent of the harm would more accurately 
capture the merits than an adjudicated resolution of 0 or 100 percent.  If a 
plaintiff has a small chance of prevailing, settlement has the potential to 
give the victory largely to the defendant while reflecting that the plaintiff’s 
claim is not entirely without merit.  And if a plaintiff has a large chance of 
prevailing, settlement has the potential to give the victory largely to the 
plaintiff while reflecting that the defendant’s defenses are not entirely 
without merit.  The all-or-nothing nature of adjudication makes it a poor 
way to achieve a nuanced reflection of the factual and legal merits in the 
absence of a clear-cut case for either the plaintiff or defendant.  The same is 
true in terms of quantifying damages whenever the amount is uncertain or 
involves subjective compensation decisions.  If a jury might reasonably 
award a plaintiff anywhere from X dollars to Y dollars on a particular 
 
 59. See id. 23(e) (requiring judicial approval of class action settlements); Erichson, 
supra note 56 (discussing the importance of judicial settlement review to protect class 
members from settlements that serve the interests of class counsel and defendants rather than 
the interests of class members). 
 60. See Eisenberg, supra note 31, at 654 (“Dispute-negotiation has a graduated and 
accommodative character:  In reaching and rationalizing outcomes, any given norm or any 
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authoritativeness and applicability (in the case of a norm) or probability (in the case of a 
factual proposition).”); Howard M. Erichson, Uncertainty and the Advantage of Collective 
Settlement, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 627, 643–45 (2011).  To this extent, I disagree with one of 
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Chair of the Litigation Section of the American Bar Association, Refo wrote, “Settlement 
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settlement, at least in the civil context. 
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claim, a settlement of halfway between X and Y may more accurately 
capture the merits than any particular jury verdict. 
Negotiation in the shadow of anticipated adjudication can capture this 
benefit of settlement.  The stronger the plaintiff’s chance of success at trial, 
the stronger the plaintiff’s negotiating position; the stronger the defendant’s 
chance of prevailing by pretrial adjudication or at trial, the stronger the 
defendant’s negotiating position.  As long as each party knows that it can 
obtain the court’s adjudication of the claim, the party may reject a 
settlement offer that fails to provide a reasonable approximation of what the 
party expects in an adjudicated outcome.61 
Negotiated resolutions have numerous other virtues, including process 
advantages such as maintaining relationships,62 and outcome advantages, 
such as the possibility of creative solutions that achieve non-zero-sum 
benefits.63  These latter virtues exist independent of anticipated 
adjudication.  The virtue of reflecting the merits by the mechanism of 
stronger and weaker bargaining positions, however, depends entirely on the 
prospect of adjudication. 
The problem of lawyer-client conflicts of interest in settlement offers an 
additional reason to worry about situations in which adjudication is hard to 
get.  On top of the concern that the absence of a realistic path to 
adjudication makes it harder for settlement to reflect the merits of disputes, 
it tends to exacerbate differences between lawyer interests and client 
interests in multiple scenarios.  And in the most extreme example of 
lawyers negotiating without the ability to pursue claims to adjudication—
putative class counsel negotiating settlement class actions—it raises the 
specter of lawyers negotiating in their own interest rather than in the 
interests of those they purport to represent. 
Disputes are resolved mostly by settlement, and that is as it should be, 
given the advantages of negotiated resolutions.  But if settlements are to 
reflect the value of claims on the fact and law, they must occur in the 
shadow of a judicial system that offers both sides the power to obtain a 
binding decision that resolves the dispute on the merits. 
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